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Abstract
In recent years, there has been an ongoing, worldwide debate about the representation of
females in companies. Our study aimed to meta-analytically investigate the controversial
relationship between female representation on corporate boards and firm financial perfor-
mance. Following a systematic literature search, data from 20 studies on 3097 companies
published in peer-reviewed academic journals were included in the meta-analysis. On aver-
age, the boards consisted of eight members and female participation was low (mean 14%)
in all studies. Half of the 20 studies were based on data from developing countries and 62%
from higher income countries. According to the random-effects model, the overall mean
weighted correlation between percentage of females on corporate boards and firm perfor-
mance was small and non-significant (r = .01, 95% confidence interval: -.04, .07). Similar
small effect sizes were observed when comparing studies based on developing vs. devel-
oped countries and higher vs. lower income countries. The mean board size was not related
to the effect sizes in studies. These results indicate that the mere representation of females
on corporate boards is not related to firm financial performance if other factors are not con-
sidered. We conclude our study with a discussion of its implications and limitations.
Introduction
Advancing gender equality and female representation in corporate governance has increasingly
become the focus of societal and political debates in various countries [1]. Despite extensive
efforts to increase women’s presence on corporate boards, men still dominate the corporate
world. The financial effects of increased female representation on corporate boards may cru-
cially determine if, and how, regulations to promote females to higher positions are imple-
mented, because pursuing financial success is an innate characteristic of every company. While
a number of scientific studies have investigated the relationship between gender diversity and
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firm financial performance, their conclusions are equivocal [2], [3]. These empirical discrepan-
cies have led to a lack of conclusive evidence about the relationship between increased female
representation and firm performance, creating uncertainty for policy makers, CEOs, and inves-
tors around the world. Owing to the conflicting evidence from primary studies, systematically
summarizing the existing data on the topic in a quantitative meta-analysis has merit. While
our general research question is similar to that of Post and Byron [4], the methodological and
analytical approach differs substantially between the two analyses. Our study aims to investi-
gate the relationship of interest with a different, more rigorous and controlled methodological
approach, and subsequently compares the results of the two meta-analyses. Investigating this
relationship in a different sample and with different operationalizations of the variables (com-
pared to Post and Byron [4]) is especially important, because, in their analysis, the overall
mean weighted correlation between female participation on boards and firm performance was
very small (only marginally different from zero). Thus, this paper investigates the general rela-
tionship between female representation and firm performance using a new and different meth-
odological approach, highlights our additional contribution to the literature, and compares the
similarities and differences between the two analyses.
Literature Overview
A board of directors monitors the activities of an organization or company. It sets the corporate
strategy, appoints and supervises senior management, and functions as the main corporate
governance mechanism. The role of the board in determining the corporate strategy therefore
influences firm performance. Since diversity is often considered a double-edged sword (e.g.,
[5]), meaning that increased diversity can result in advantages and disadvantages regarding
desired outcomes, a board composed of diverse directors affects firm performance either posi-
tively or negatively. Diversity’s positive and negative effects could also neutralize each other, or
could depend on how it is managed [6]. Along these lines, a meta-analysis by Webber and
Donahue [3] examined the effects of diversity on work group performance in a sample of 45
effect sizes. Low job-related (e.g., age, gender) and highly job-related diversity (e.g., educational
background) were measured, but both failed to show a significant relationship with work
group performance.
Further, primary studies also do not show a clear consensus on whether gender diversity
benefits or disadvantages firm performance [7], [8]. At first glance, the relationship between
female representation on corporate boards and firm financial performance shows a similar pat-
tern to that of the general diversity-performance relationship, being either positive [9], negative
[10], or non-significant [11]. Thus, it remains unclear if increased female representation on
corporate boards is associated with firm performance, and, if so, in which direction.
Advocates of greater female representation on corporate boards usually rely on two lines of
arguments: the ethical or the business case for diversity [12]. The former argues that women
should be considered for leadership positions for equality reasons. The aim is therefore not
directly to increase performance, but rather that greater female representation is considered a
positive and just result in itself [13]. Thus, a higher proportion of females on boards might not
necessarily be related to better firm performance, but would reflect that boards with more
females closely represent the ‘real world’, while other factors than gender alone contribute to
better financial outcomes. The business case for diversity holds that if a board comprises het-
erogeneous directors, diversity leverages financial growth and success [12], indicating that a
higher proportion of females could be related to better firm performance. A final outcome,
not explained by either of the cases above, would be a negative relationship between a higher
proportion of females on boards and lower firm performance. The aim of this article is to
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summarize the already existing quantitative evidence and attempt to explain the results in light
of these cases.
Positive Effects of Increased Female Representation on Firm
Performance
The business case for diversity holds that diverse team members improve corporate governance
by introducing broader knowledge bases and experiences [12], [14]. Accordingly, the cognitive
resource model suggests that as (gender) diversity in groups increases, the available cognitive
resources increase as well [15], [16]. If used effectively, these diverse perspectives can contrib-
ute to a more thorough search for alternative solutions to problems because they introduce
new perspectives to the boardroom [17]. These diverse perspectives also foster a critical analy-
sis of complex problems, prevent premature decision-making [5], [6], [18], [19], and develop
creative and innovative solutions [20]. Hence, increased female representation on corporate
boards should improve firm financial performance through the diverse perspectives introduced
to the boardroom.
Another essential argument in support of the business case for diversity is that women
introduce useful female leadership qualities and skills to the boardroom. These include, for
example, risk averseness and less radical decision-making [21], [22], as well as more sustainable
investment strategies [23]. In addition, female leaders fulfill their leadership roles in a more
transformational way than their male counterparts, distinguishing themselves especially
through their encouraging and supportive treatment of colleagues and subordinates (i.e.,
individualized consideration; [24]). Females are also said to value their responsibilities as direc-
tors higher, which is associated with more effective corporate governance [25]. Furthermore,
diversity on corporate boards generally benefits organizations, by providing wider and better
connections and ties to suppliers, organizations, and consumers, which decrease market uncer-
tainties and dependencies [8]. In sum, an increased female presence on corporate boards is
associated with the introduction of new desirable leadership skills and a variety of strategic
advantages for companies. Following this reasoning, we expect a positive relationship between
increased female representation and firm financial performance.
Negative Effects of Increased Female Representation on Firm
Performance
Individuals are likely to perceive others and themselves in terms of salient social categories,
such as gender, thereby creating in- and out-groups [26]. These categorization tendencies,
which might lead to heightened gender salience and a perceived lack of alignment with the
group’s stereotypes [27], can compromise functional team processes when demographic sub-
groups emerge. If the emerging subgroups on corporate boards are based on gender, communi-
cation and cooperation might be impaired [6], leading to increased conflicts between board
members. The probability of conflict might be further enhanced if the directors identify stron-
ger with the opinions of fellow directors of the same gender [28], or if the introduction of new
perspectives, previously mentioned as one of diverse groups’ advantages, backfires [29]. In
turn, this potential for interpersonal conflicts might retard the decision-making process and
lead to a lack of cohesion between board members and to decreased strategic consensus [30],
[31], hindering corporate boards’ effectiveness. In fast-paced environments, such as on corpo-
rate boards where strategic decisions need to be taken quickly, conflict-free communication is
crucial to maintain effective performance [32]. And even if these issues can be overcome, the
additional time and resources spent on solving them might decrease group and organizational
performance [33].
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These far-reaching potentials for impaired team processes might especially challenge
females, who struggle to participate and maintain their standing in the already male-dominated
boardroom [34] and are at risk of experiencing role ambiguity and role conflict, because they
do not conform to typical gender roles in leadership [35]. Such females might be perceived as
“tokens” to meet society’s expectations or those of important stakeholders, and could therefore
be marginalized and not be taken seriously on the board [36], which might subsequently hinder
their and the entire board’s performance [37], [38].
All in all, increased female representation could potentially lead to decreased firm financial
performance due to a number of strategic disadvantages, increased interpersonal conflicts, and
their associated negative consequences. Following this reasoning, we expect a negative relation-
ship between increased female representation and firm financial performance.
In conclusion, it is difficult to determine the relationship between female representation on
boards and firm performance a priori. Summarizing all studies measuring the relationship
between female representation on corporate boards and firm financial performance could pro-
vide substantive evidence to address the question whether increased female representation on
corporate boards alone is positively or negatively related to firm financial performance. The
meta-analysis by Post and Byron [4] provided the first systematic summary of this relationship
in studies selected from a range of electronic databases and unpublished sources. Using 140
studies (92 published, 48 unpublished), they show that the relationship is very small (r = 0.047
between female representation and accounting returns, and r = 0.014 between female represen-
tation and market performance), and that it might depend on moderators, such as shareholder
protection or gender parity in a given country. As opposed to Post and Byron [4], our study fol-
lows a more rigorous and controlled methodological approach by investigating the relationship
between percentage of females on corporate boards and firm financial performance, operationa-
lized as return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and Tobin’s Q (Q), by means of a
meta-analysis of articles published in peer-reviewed academic journals. These narrow operatio-
nalizations of the variables could increase the certainty with which theoretical and practical
implications can be deduced. In light of the study by Post and Byron [4], we also aim to com-
pare the results of the two meta-analyses. A systematic investigation of the published literature
could also reveal potential moderators of such a relationship based on systematic differences
between various studies in terms of their source of data and company characteristics, which
could only be determined post hoc once we had located and coded all the available data. Based
on the studies reviewed above and the meta-analysis of Post and Byron [4], we hypothesized
that female representation on corporate boards is either positively or negatively related to firm
financial performance, but that the magnitude of such a relationship is likely to be small.
Methods
Systematic Search Strategy
A systematic literature search was conducted in EBSCO on March 7, 2014, using the search
strategy described in Table 1. The databases and the search terms we utilized differ from those
used by Post and Byron [4]. Therefore, the two meta-analyses are based on a different sample
of articles. In addition, we conducted a hand-search of the reference sections of review articles
in this field and of Google Scholar, using the terms listed in Table 1 between March 7 and May
12, 2014. Unlike Post and Byron [4], we only searched for (and included) studies published in
peer-reviewed academic journals.
Study Selection
The study selection process is summarized on the PRISMA flowchart [39], Fig 1.
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Of the 325 sources identified during the electronic search (Table 1) and the 17 sources iden-
tified through the hand search, 52 studies met the inclusion criteria and were fully examined
(Fig 1). The studies selected for the final meta-analysis had to have a quantitative design and
report the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient, r, between the percentage female
representation on boards of directors and firm performance (measured as ROA, ROE, or Q),
with the number of observations (number of firms × total length of data collection in years)
used as the sample size. Studies not reporting the correlation coefficient, but including the vari-
ables required in our analysis, were also included in our sample if the authors (contacted via
email) provided these correlations. Studies were excluded if other performance measures were
used (e.g., return on investment, firm value). We focused on ROA, ROE, and Q, because they
are relatively objective and the most commonly used indicators of organizational performance.
Return on investments and firm value were not used, because there might be large differences
in these measures due to economic differences between countries or due to strategic orienta-
tions. Unlike in Post and Byron [4], studies were excluded from our meta-analysis if female
representation was measured as a dichotomous variable (presence vs. absence of females on
board), or if they used measures that did not explicitly target the representation of females
Table 1. Search terms and databases (all searches conducted in English).
Number of
sources (k)
Search terms and limits Databases (1986-March 2014)
325 [Subject OR Title (“gender diversity” OR gender
OR female OR wom*n OR "board diversity" OR
"board of director*" OR "board structure")] AND
[Subject OR Title (“organi*ation* performance”
OR “ﬁrm performance” OR "ﬁnancial performance"
OR “company performance”)]; limits: Academic
Articles, English Language
PsycInfo; EconLit; Business Source
Premier; Academic Search Premier
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130005.t001
Fig 1. Study assessment and exclusion criteria. k = number of studies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130005.g001
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(e.g., the Blau Index or the Shannon Index), because they might bias the analysis. We also
excluded studies that assessed female representation in an inappropriate body (such as the
management or owners). This approach allowed us to achieve a reliable measure of female par-
ticipation on corporate boards.
Definition of variables
Firm performance measures. Firm performance was measured with three variables. First,
ROA is computed by dividing the “earnings before extraordinary income and preferred divi-
dend in financial year” by the “average of book values of total assets at the beginning and at the
end of [a] financial year” [40]. The ROA measures the company’s production of “accounting
based revenues in excess of actual expenses from a given portfolio of assets measured as amor-
tized historical costs” [18]. Second, ROE is computed by dividing the company’s “earnings
before extraordinary income and preferred dividend in [a] financial year” by the “average of
book values of common equity at the beginning and at the end of a financial year” [40]. Thus,
this measure assesses the returns to the company’s shareholders. ROE and ROA share a charac-
teristic in that they are both “backward looking” accounting-based measures, meaning that
they are based on the company’s self-reported financial performance in the recent past [40].
Third, Tobin’s Q is a market-based firm performance index calculated by dividing the firm’s
“year-end market capitalization and average of book values of total debt at the beginning and
at the end of [a] financial year” by the “average of book values of total assets at the beginning
and at the end of [a] financial year” [40]. This measure is increasingly used in diversity research
and scholars argue that it is more reliable than accounting-based measures [41], because it rep-
resents a “forward looking” measure, meaning that it reflects the future potential of a firm’s
performance [40]. Beyond this, it is a standardized measure with intuitive interpretation crite-
ria: If the ratio is greater than one, the firm has a higher ability to create value by effectively
allocating its resources, indicating a high competitive advantage for that firm [42]. In contrast
to ROE and ROA, this measure lacks an accounting convention bias, because it is considered
objective by not relying on self-reported data [41].
Female Representation. Female representation was measured as the percentage of females
on corporate boards.
Moderator variables. In addition to performance measures and female representation on
boards, the following variables were included in the current analysis due to the relevant data in
all, or most, of the studies:
1. Country development and income. Using the countries in which data were collected, we clas-
sified studies into dichotomous groups based on their economic development status (devel-
oped: k = 9; developing: k = 10) and their Gross National Income per capita (GNI; high
income: k = 13; low income: k = 6; [43]).
2. Mean board size. This variable was a scale measure of the mean number of directors on
boards.
Data extraction
Data were extracted independently by three authors of this study from k = 20 studies (Post and
Byron [4] included 13 of the 20 studies from our sample in their analysis), resulting in 34
coded effect sizes, and any inconsistencies were resolved during discussions. The authors of 16
studies were contacted via e-mail by the third author and seven provided additional data
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(either the sample size used for correlations or the correlation coefficients if they were not
reported). Table 2 lists the study characteristics and effect size data.
Data analysis (Meta-analysis)
The effect size used in the current meta-analysis was the Pearson product moment correlation
coefficient, r. The interpretation criteria for the absolute magnitude of r are: .1 small, .3
medium, and .5 large [59]. The meta-analysis was computed using Comprehensive Meta-Anal-
ysis 2.0 (CMA; Biostat, USA) according to the random-effects model with inverse-variance
weights [60]. The analysis was conducted in the following steps [60]:
1. The effect size data (r and N) were reported for each study. Since the variance of r is biased
based on the magnitude of r, CMA converts r to Fisher’s z, computes all subsequent analyses
on Fisher’s z, and converts the final results back to r.
2. Each effect size (Fisher’s z) was weighted according to the inverse-variance method (inverse
of the sum of within- and between-study variance; [61]).
3. The overall mean weighted effect size of all studies was computed according to the random-
effects model, where overall r is the sum of the product of all r (expressed as Fisher’s z) and
weights divided by the sum of all weights. This model was used, because we assumed that
the effect sizes would differ between studies in the analysis due to differences in study char-
acteristics and because we only identified a random sample of all studies on this topic in our
literature search.
The heterogeneity between study effect sizes was computed using a Q statistic and an I2
index, where I2 = 100%×(Q-df)/Q with df = k-1 and k = number of studies [60]. The I2 index
quantifies the variability in the effect sizes due to real (rather than chance) differences between
studies. This variability can be interpreted as low (25%), moderate (50%), or high (75%) hetero-
geneity due to real differences between studies [62].
Publication bias analysis
Studies with statistically significant and high effect sizes are more likely to be published in aca-
demic journals [60]. Such a publication bias could have inflated the result of our meta-analysis,
which focused specifically on findings published in academic journals. Thus, we controlled for
publication bias using methods available in CMA. Specifically, publication bias could be pres-
ent if:
1. Rosenthal’s Fail Safe-N is low, meaning that it takes only a few theoretically missing studies
with low effect sizes to nullify the result of a meta-analysis [63],
2. a funnel plot of standard error by Fisher’s z in each study is not symmetrical [64] and math-
ematically correcting for symmetry (using the trim-and-fill analysis) changes the interpreta-
tion of the overall analysis [65],
3. the study effect sizes and precision differ systematically according to the statistically signifi-
cant Begg and Mazumdar correlation [66] and Egger’s regression [64].
Sensitivity and moderator analyses
The stability of the overall mean weighted r over time was investigated by adding one study at a
time to all previous studies (cumulative analysis). The influence of individual studies on the
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Table 2. Study characteristics and effect size data in 20 studies included in the meta-analysis.
Study Period Data Source Country DEV/
DC
GNI Performance
Measure
Mean
(SD)
%
Female
r N No.
Firms
Board
[44] 2007–
2011
Annual reports of all
commercial banks
Kenya DC LI ROA —- —- .4760 45 9 —-
[44] 2007–
2011
Annual reports of all
commercial banks
Kenya DC LI ROE —- —- .0940 45 9 —-
[45] 2001–
2009
Publicly limited ﬁrms
on the OSE
Norway DEV HI Q 1.55 (—-) 24.58 -.0665 1074 248 5.48
[46] 2000–
2009
Publicly limited
Norwegian ﬁrms
Norway DEV HI ROA —- 17.00 .0290 1560 ~274 5.60
[47] 2003–
2007
Publicly limited ﬁrms
in Norway
Norway DEV HI ROA 4.00
(17.00)
14.55 .0898 1279 128 7.56
[48] 2007 Public ﬁrms listed on
the ISE
Indonesia DC LI ROA 3.68
(7.12)
12.00 -.0700 169 169 8.44
[48] 2007 Public ﬁrms listed on
the ISE
Indonesia DC LI Q 2.08
(5.08)
12.00 -.1600 169 169 8.44
[49] 2005–
2007
Australian Securities
Exchange
Australia DEV HI ROA 8.24
(6.29)
9.00 -.0600 151 151 7.58
[49] 2005–
2007
Australian Securities
Exchange
Australia DEV HI ROE 15.27
(10.59)
9.00 .2200 151 151 7.58
[50] 2004–
2009
Insurance ﬁrms listed
on NSE
Nigeria DC LI ROA —- 9.51 .1389 72 12 9.06
[50] 2004–
2009
Insurance ﬁrms listed
on NSE
Nigeria DC LI ROE —- 9.51 .1635 72 12 9.06
[50] 2004–
2009
Insurance ﬁrms listed
on NSE
Nigeria DC LI Q —- 9.51 .0460 72 12 9.06
[40] 2001–
2005
FTSE 100 UK DEV HI ROA —- 8.44 .0400 486 97 11.30
[40] 2001–
2005
FTSE 100 UK DEV HI ROE —- 8.44 .0300 486 97 11.30
[40] 2001–
2005
FTSE 100 UK DEV HI Q —- 8.44 -.1100 486 97 11.30
[51] 2008–
2009
Firms listed on the
Bursa Malaysia
Malaysia DC HI ROA 3.41 (—-) 10.62 -.0150 280 280 7.63
[33] 1995–
2004
MFI in Ghana Ghana DC LI ROA 39.16
(152.43)
37.38 .0111 520 52 6.23
[52] 2055–
2007
Firms listed on the
AEX
Netherlands DEV HI ROE 14.91
(—-)
4.02 .3280 297 99 7.77
[9] 2007 Publicly listed ﬁrms in
Mauritius
Mauritius DC HI ROA —- 3.10 .3370 42 42 9.60
[10] 1997–
2011
Publicly traded Bank
Holding Companies
USA DEV HI ROA 4.65
(1.82)
7.94 -.1400 2640 212 12.68
[10] 1997–
2011
Publicly traded Bank
Holding Companies
USA DEV HI ROE 9.92
(14.60)
7.94 -.1000 2640 212 12.68
[10] 1997–
2011
Publicly traded Bank
Holding Companies
USA DEV HI Q 1.07
(0.07)
7.94 -.1500 2640 212 12.68
[53] 2004–
2006
Spanish ﬁrms on the
MSE
Spain DEV HI ROA —- —- -.0200 288 96 —-
[53] 2004–
2006
Spanish ﬁrms on the
MSE
Spain DEV HI ROE —- —- -.0250 288 96 —-
[53] 2004–
2006
Spanish ﬁrms on the
MSE
Spain DEV HI Q —- —- .0610 288 96 —-
[54] 2008–
2012
Leading banks in
Pakistan
Pakistan DC LI ROA 3.10
(3.74)
33.30 -.0490 30 6 —-
(Continued)
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overall mean weighted r was investigated by removing one study at a time from the overall
analysis (one-study removed analysis). The moderator analyses (subgroup analyses and univar-
iate meta-regressions) were used to test the influence of systematic differences between studies
on the overall mean weighted r.
Results
Study characteristics
A total of 20 studies with 34 effect sizes were included in the current meta-analysis. Firm per-
formance was measured according to ROA in 85% of effect sizes (k = 17), ROE in 45% (k = 9),
and Q in 40% (k = 8; Table 3). All 34 effect sizes were based on an average of 734 observations
from 146 firms collected in slightly more than five years (Table 3). On average, the boards in
those firms consisted of almost eight members with a low female representation (14%;
Table 3). Half of all effect sizes were based on data from developing countries and data in 62%
of the studies came from high income countries (Table 3).
Relationship between percentage of female representation and firm
performance
There was a small positive, but not statistically significant, relationship between the percentage
female representation on corporate boards and the combined mean of the three firm
Table 2. (Continued)
Study Period Data Source Country DEV/
DC
GNI Performance
Measure
Mean
(SD)
%
Female
r N No.
Firms
Board
[55] 2011 Firms listed on Bursa
Malaysia
Malaysia DC LI ROE 6.73
(11.27)
9.82 .0940 300 300 7.35
[11] 1998–
2008
Agencies rating MFI Worldwide —- —- ROA —- —- -.0039 497 329 —-
[11] 1998–
2008
Agencies rating MFI Worldwide —- —- ROE —- —- .0029 462 329 —-
[56] 2006–
2007
Standard & Poor’s 500
Companies
USA DEV HI ROA 0.00
(8.00)
14.00 .1000 185 185 10.48
[57] 2006–
2010
Non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
listed on the CSE
Sri Lanka DC LI ROA 1.28
(0.83)
7.37 -.0112 440 88 7.33
[57] 2006–
2010
Non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
listed on the CSE
Sri Lanka DC LI Q —- 7.37 -.4300 440 88 7.33
[58] 2000–
2009
Private listed ﬁrms on
the CACM
China DC HI ROA 3.81
(5.70)
12.33 -.0118 3197 ~320 2.18
[58] 2000–
2009
Privately listed ﬁrms
on the CACM
China DC HI Q 2.25
(1.47)
12.33 .0867 3197 ~320 2.18
Abbreviations: AEX = Amsterdam Euronext Stock Exchange; ASX = Australian Securities Exchange; Board = mean size of the board; CACM = China’s
A-Share Capital Market; Country = country of data collection; CSE = Colombo Stock Exchange; Data Source = Sampling Source of the studies; DC =
developing country; DEV = developed country; FTSE = Financial Times Stock Exchange; GNI = Gross National Income Classiﬁcation; HI = high-income;
IPO = Initial Public Offering; ISE = Indonesian Stock Exchange; LI = low-income; Mean (SD) = mean (and standard deviation) of the performance measure;
MFI = Microﬁnance Institutions; MSE = Madrid Stock Exchange; N = number of observations (number of ﬁrms × total length of data collection in years);
NSE = Nigerian Stock Exchange; No. Firms = Number of ﬁrms in sample; OSE = Oslo Stock Exchange; Period = time frame in which data were collected;
% Female = percentage of female board members.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130005.t002
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performance measures; overall mean weighted r = .01, 95% confidence interval, CI [-.04, .07],
p = .598, k = 20 (Fig 2). High variability in effect sizes among the 20 studies existed (I2 = 87%,
Q = 142.84, df = 19, p< .001).
Publication bias analysis
Since the overall result of our analysis was not statistically significant, Rosenthal’s Fail-Safe N
was not applicable. Nevertheless, there was little evidence of publication bias in the current
analysis, because the funnel plot (Fig 3) was mathematically symmetrical around the central
vertical line (corresponding to the overall mean weighted effect size) according to the trim-
and-fill analysis. Thus, the overall mean weighted effect size in the analysis (unfilled diamond)
and the overall effect corrected for potential missing studies (filled diamond) are aligned and
no filled circles (theoretically missing studies) are shown on the plot (Fig 3). The symmetry is
particularly evident in the area towards the top of Fig 3, showing the studies (unfilled circles)
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for k = 20 studies included in the current meta-analysis.
k studies (% of 20)
WESP
# developing countries (% within outcome) 9 (45%)
# developed countries (% within outcome) 10 (50%)
GNI
# high-income countries (% within outcome) 13 (62%)
# low-income countries (% within outcome) 6 (32%)
Mean number of observations (SD) 734 (875)
Mean number of ﬁrms (SD) 146 (104)
Mean board size (SD) 7.89 (2.49)
Mean % female (SD) 13.82 (9.52)
Mean data collection period (SD) 5.32 (3.99)
Note. Abbreviations: GNI = Gross National Income per capita; Q = Tobin’s Q; ROA = Return on Assets;
ROE = Return on Equity; SD = standard deviation; WESP = World Economic Situations and Prospects
classiﬁcation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130005.t003
Fig 2. Forest plot of the association between percentage female representation on corporate boards
and firm performance. ‘Correlation’ refers to the weighted Pearson product moment correlation coefficient,
r. ‘Combined’ refers to the mean effect size in studies using multiple measures of firm performance. ‘Total’
refers to the total number of observations per study (number of firms × number of years). The diamond
depicts the overall mean weighted effect size r of all k = 20 studies. There is a small positive, but not
statistically significant, relationship between percentage female representation on corporate boards and firm
performance (overall mean weighted r = .01, 95% confidence interval, 95%CI:-.04, .07).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130005.g002
Female Representation on Boards and Firm Financial Performance
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0130005 June 18, 2015 10 / 20
with the lowest estimated variability in effect sizes, and, thus, the highest precision. These stud-
ies contributed the most weights to the calculation of the overall mean weighted effect size in
the current meta-analysis. Therefore, confirming the results on the forest plot (Fig 2), the stud-
ies with the most weights had either positive, negative, or close to null effect sizes, indicating
that there was no preference for high positive, or high negative, effects in the current meta-
analysis. Although the studies towards the bottom of Fig 3 appear less symmetrically distrib-
uted, these had high estimated variability of effect sizes, low weights, and, thus, little influence
on the overall mean weighted effect size in the current analysis. Finally, study effect sizes and
precision did not differ systematically according to the non-significant Begg and Mazumdar
correlation coefficient (p = .770) and Egger’s regression intercept (p = .374).
Fig 3. Funnel plot of the estimated variability (standard error of the mean, SEM) and effect size r
(expressed as Fisher’s z) in each study. This plot shows that the effect sizes in the individual studies
(circles) were symmetrically distributed around the overall mean weighted effect size shown on the vertical
line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130005.g003
Fig 4. Forest plot of the cumulative analysis. ‘Combined’ refers to the mean effect size of studies that have
used multiple measures of firm performance. ‘Total’ refers to the total number of observations (number of
firms × number of years) as one study is added to all previous studies in each row. The plot shows how the
overall mean weighted effect size r (referred to as ‘Point’) changes as each study is added over time to all
previous studies. The diamond depicts the overall mean weighted effect size r of all k = 20 studies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130005.g004
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Sensitivity analysis
The cumulative analysis showed that the overall mean weighted r remained consistently small
and non-significant as studies were added one at a time (based on publication date) from 2006
to 2014 (Fig 4).
Similarly, the overall mean weighted r was not influenced by any one study, because it
remained small and non-significant as one study at a time was removed from the overall analy-
sis (Fig 5).
Subgroup analysis and meta-regression
According to a subgroup analysis, the overall outcome of the current meta-analysis was not
dependent on the performance measure. Specifically, the overall mean weighted r remained
consistently small and non-significant when studies were grouped according to individual per-
formance indicators (Table 4).
Similarly, the overall mean weighted r remained consistently small and non-significant
when studies were grouped according to either country development (developed vs. develop-
ing) or country income (lower vs. higher income); Table 4.
Fig 5. One-study removed analysis. Combined’ refers to the mean effect size from studies that have used
multiple measures of firm performance. The plot shows the overall mean weighted effect size r (referred to as
‘Point’) for all studies, except the study in each row. The diamond depicts the overall mean weighted effect
size r of all k = 20 studies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130005.g005
Table 4. Results of the moderator analysis and the meta-regressions.
Subgroups k studies (% of 20) Mean weighted r (95%CI) ptwo-tailed
Performance Measure
ROA 17 (85%) .00 (-.05, .05) .861
ROE 9 (45%) .08 (-.02, .19) .125
Q 8 (40%) -.10 (-.21, .02) .107
WESP Development
Developed countries 9 (47%) -.02 (-.06, .10) .661
Developing countries 10 (53%) .01 (-.07, .10) .753
GNI
Lower income countries 6 (32%) -.02 (-.17, .12) .750
Higher income countries 13 (68%) .03 (-.03, .10) .310
Meta-regression predictor k studies Slope Slope ptwo-tailed
Mean Board Size 16 -.01 .400
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130005.t004
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Finally, as shown in Table 4, the univariate meta-regression showed that the weighted effect
sizes in individual studies (outcome) were not dependent on the mean board size (predictor).
Discussion
The main finding of the current study, based on data from 20 studies (34 effect sizes) published
only in peer-reviewed academic journals, is that the relationship between the percentage of
female directors on corporate boards and firm financial performance is consistently small and
non-significant. The general magnitude of this result is in line with findings of Post and Byron
[4], who, based on data from 140 published and unpublished studies, also found a small corre-
lation between gender diversity on corporate boards and firm financial performance. This is
especially noteworthy, because both meta-analyses are based on different study samples and
different operationalizations of the main measures (female representation and firm perfor-
mance), providing further evidence to conclude that female representation and firm perfor-
mance are not strongly associated. Interestingly, the two meta-analyses differ in that Post and
Byron [4] find a statistically significant correlation between increased gender diversity on cor-
porate boards and higher accounting returns. But concluding that a higher female representa-
tion on corporate boards has practical implications for the generation of profits from assets
and investments seems debatable due to the overall small effect size. By testing the relationship
of interest with our more rigorous and controlled methodological approach (for example, by
including only peer-reviewed and published studies), we provide further evidence that female
representation on corporate boards is not associated, positively or negatively, with firm perfor-
mance. Although both meta-analyses indicate only a very small correlation, primary research
should further investigate the relationship between boards’ gender composition and firm per-
formance. This is because, as argued below, the relationship might be too complex to be investi-
gated on a univariate level.
In our international sample, female representation on corporate boards was not significantly
related to firm financial performance, as measured by the “backward-looking” measures ROA
and ROE and the forward-looking measure Tobin’s Q, if we did not control for any other fac-
tors. This result is in line with other primary studies and meta-analyses [3]. [57], [67], indicat-
ing only a small association between (gender) diversity and firm financial performance, while
contrasting individual studies that find either a positive [9] or negative relationship [10]
between gender diversity and firm performance.
Results of both meta-analyses provide little evidence to support the business case for gender
diversity. However, more importantly, a higher representation of females on corporate boards
is also not associated with a detrimental effect on firm financial performance, which supports
the ethical case for diversity. If increased female representation on corporate boards is not posi-
tively or negatively associated with firm performance, it seems reasonable to promote gender
equality in board representation. Given the current underrepresentation of females on corpo-
rate boards in all studies included in our sample, and possibly in all countries worldwide (the
largest average percentage of female directors included in our sample was 37% [33] and the
overall average was only 14%), women should be prioritized for promotions if they are equally
qualified. By bringing the performance-based and the ethical view together, fostering gender
diversity in boardrooms seems justified and desirable.
We do, however, acknowledge that our univariate approach to this intricate research ques-
tion is rather simplistic and might not do justice to the vast econometric complexity present
when studying the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. Numerous
other variables not investigated in this study might influence the relationship between female
representation on corporate boards and firm financial performance. Future meta-analyses
Female Representation on Boards and Firm Financial Performance
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0130005 June 18, 2015 13 / 20
should investigate the relationship between various other diversity variables, such as age, tenure
or education, on corporate boards and firm financial performance and subsume them in one
analysis. Such an inclusive approach would yield benefits for practitioners and scientists.
The board’s limited influence on the firm financial performance might be a reason for the
small overall effect size in the current meta-analysis. According to Bertrand and Schoar [68],
the CEO and CFO only explain about 5 to 6% of variance in corporate performance measures.
Hence, the boards’ effect on actual firm performance may be limited in general. Various other
factors which the board cannot alter or influence, such as the current economic and political
situation, influence companies’ performance. Although such factors might be more important
for firm performance than gender alone, they are difficult to quantify numerically for meta-
analytic purposes.
When the business case might still matter
The business case for diversity should not be abolished altogether. Whether an increased repre-
sentation of females and the concomitant increase in gender diversity on corporate boards lead
to performance benefits for the firm might depend on contextual factors, or on how diversity is
managed. In our analysis, we aimed to find moderators of this relationship based on systematic
differences between studies. Not surprisingly, the process of finding specific moderators was
difficult, because there was high heterogeneity among studies in terms of reported study char-
acteristics which could be used as potential moderators.
The relationship between female representation and firm performance remained indepen-
dent of how firm financial performance was measured. This supports our initial assumption
that these outcome measures are relatively objective and measure firm financial performance
similarly. In addition, this finding increases the certainty with which our results can be inter-
preted, because the non-significant relationship seems to be independent of the outcome mea-
sure. On a descriptive level, the results of this subgroup analysis are also in line with Post and
Byron [4], who find that accounting returns, such as ROA and ROE, increase and market per-
formance (Tobin’s Q) remains unrelated to whether there are more female directors on corpo-
rate boards. While the significant positive relationship between accounting returns and female
representation on corporate boards, which Post and Byron [4] find, deviates from our nonsig-
nificant finding regarding these performance measures, their large sample size, which increased
the power of their analysis and the likelihood of finding a significant result, is likely the reason
for this deviation. Regardless of statistical significance, the overall magnitude of their effect size
for ROA and ROE was similar to our effect sizes, and deducing practical implications from
such small effect sizes might be debatable and misleading.
The characteristics of the country in which data were collected in the individual studies had
little influence on the effect sizes in the current analysis. Neither a country’s development sta-
tus, nor its GNI per capita influenced the relationship between female representation and firm
financial performance. Thus, whether a country is considered developed/developing or “poor”/
“rich” does not influence the effect that female board members have on firm performance.
While previous studies have shown that a country’s characteristics, such as a long history of
female participation in politics [69], influence the presence of women on corporate boards, our
results suggest that a country’s characteristics related to economic performance do not influ-
ence the relationship between female representation and firm financial performance. This indi-
cates that aiming for equality should guide decisions regarding future promotion to corporate
boards, irrespective of a country’s economic status.
In addition to our more rigorous meta-analytical approach to the research question, we
also tested what Post and Byron [4] called for: the moderating effect of board size on the
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relationship between female representation and firm performance. Larger boards might make
it more difficult for directors to influence decisions and might limit the influence of directors
on important decisions overall [70], [71], and the percentage of female directors on larger
boards would therefore also matter less. However, the number of directors on corporate boards
did not significantly influence the effect size distribution in our analysis, suggesting that the
non-significant relationship between female representation and firm performance remains
similar, regardless of how many directors are on corporate boards, at least on the meta-analysis
level. This is somewhat surprising, because larger boards usually experience a higher complex-
ity in all decision-making processes [72] and have been shown to be associated with decreased
financial performance (ROE; [73]). The increased complexity on larger boards might make it
even more difficult for females to have an impact, given their apparently wide underrepresenta-
tion. In conclusion, although a higher representation of females on boards does not appear to
be directly associated with financial performance, more females on corporate boards might
indirectly influence firms’ financial performance. For example, females might provide a protec-
tive effect against larger boards’ apparently increased interpersonal conflicts. However, this
requires further research.
Limitations and Future Research
There were a number of limitations in the current study. First, the main limitation is the small
sample size of only 20 studies in our analysis, making it difficult to accept the null hypothesis
due to low statistical power. However, overall, Post and Byron [4] also report a similar result
based on the higher number of studies in their analysis. Thus, it is unlikely that the apparent
lack of a meaningful relationship between female representation on corporate boards and firm
performance just resulted from low statistical power in both meta-analyses. Interestingly,
regardless of the studies’ high heterogeneity, the variability of the overall mean weighted effect
sizes is reasonably consistent in our analysis. Specifically, as shown on Fig 2, the effect sizes in
all 20 studies can be classified as either positively or negatively small (most weighted correla-
tion coefficients between ± .3). Thus, although it cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely that statisti-
cal power alone, or one or more hidden factors, consistently suppressed a relationship between
female representation on boards and firm financial performance based on data from different
countries and various industries. Future primary studies should attempt to focus on other
diversity factors, such as educational level or the seniority of female board members of success-
ful companies to determine how these characteristics affect firm performance.
Second, the quality of the included studies was not assessed by means of standardized scales.
Instead, we only selected studies published in academic journals, assuming that such studies
are of a higher quality than unpublished sources, because experts had reviewed them. Further-
more, we also assumed that academic research on the topic might be more value-free than
those in unpublished sources. Our assumption might not have been entirely correct, because
the quality of the reported statistical data was generally poor in many of the examined studies.
For example, although most studies conducted complex multivariate statistical analyses, it was
often unclear if the reported regression coefficients were unstandardized or standardized
(meaning that high-quality multivariate data corrected for various factors could not be used in
our analysis). Therefore, the authors of future primary studies should use standardized guide-
lines to report quantitative results, which can be subsequently utilized in meta-analyses.
Third, including only published sources could potentially lead to a publication bias (infla-
tion of effect sizes) in a meta-analysis. However, based on the outcome of the various tests we
conducted, there was little evidence of publication bias in our analysis. Interestingly, in the cur-
rent analysis, the strongest evidence against publication bias is a simple visual inspection of the
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data in Fig 2. All the effect sizes in this figure are small, suggesting that the opposite of publica-
tion bias might have occurred in this analysis. That is, we might have failed to find studies with
highmagnitude effect sizes in the positive or negative direction.
Fourth, the current study relies on a linear model to determine the relationship between
female representation and firm financial performance. It is possible that such a relationship
depends on multiple factors in a non-linear fashion and that this changes over time. Thus, the
linear assessment of data collected over a number of years might have contributed to the low
effect sizes in the current meta-analysis. In general, it is difficult to determine the correct ana-
lytical approach to such a complex topic. Specifically, the relationship between female repre-
sentation and firm financial performance was low, not only on a univariate study level, but also
after the application of multivariate linear and non-linear approaches in the primary studies
included in our analysis. Thus, the relationship between gender and financial performance
might be truly negligible compared to other factors that might affect financial performance.
Thus, future studies should focus on devising novel analytical approaches to study this topic.
Fifth, the data in our analysis come from countries with differing legal and board systems.
Most pronounced is the difference between the one-tier and the two-tier board system, with
various smaller differences between countries. In a one-tier board system, which is prevalent in
the United States, the board is solely responsible for all corporate decisions. Inside directors,
who are directly employed in the company, represent the interests of the company’s stakehold-
ers, while outside directors, who are usually employed in other companies, bring a different
perspective and objectivity to the boardroom. A two-tier board system, which, for example, is
common in Germany, consists of an executive board and a supervisory board. The executive
board manages the day-to-day business and the supervisory board supervises the executive
board’s decisions. We did not investigate the influence of these factors, because there are too
many minor differences between countries and they are too widespread to classify. While we
do not expect these country differences to have a large influence on the current results, they
might have contributed to the high heterogeneity in the studies’ effect sizes. Meta-analytically
investigating the differing role that the diversity of internal and external directors might play in
the boardroom with regards to firm performance could provide a future contribution to the sci-
entific literature.
Sixth, two studies included in our sample were classified as statistical outliers due to their
extreme effect sizes in opposite directions [44], [57]. The removal of these studies did not
change the outcome of our analysis. These studies possibly were outliers, because both included
a relatively small number of firms, nine and 88, respectively (compared to the mean number of
firms of 146 in all the studies; see Table 3). This might have increased the influence of individ-
ual firms and thereby skewed those studies’ results.
Seventh, it is possible that not all 20 studies were based on independent data, meaning that
some firms might have contributed more data to the overall effect size than others. There was a
possible overlap in the included firms from the same countries, because the primary studies did
not rely on single firm data, but rather on data from business databases from the same country.
For example, data from Norway were included in three studies in the current analysis [45]-
[47]. To reduce this potential overlap in the data, we only once included data from the same
time period, utilizing the same outcome measure in the same country.
Eighth, an overall higher representation of females might be needed in order to identify a
relationship between diversity and performance. A shortcoming of the included data is that
they are restricted in range, because the largest percentage of female directors included in our
sample was 37% and the average was about 14%. This limits the meaningfulness of our find-
ings, because few female directors are present in all the studies in general. This result supports
the notion that more females should be promoted to director positions to meaningfully
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investigate the effects of gender diversity on performance. In accordance with this proposition,
Joecks et al. [74] suggest that a relatively low representation of females on boards first has a
negative effect on firm performance (contradicting our findings), which only becomes positive
after a critical mass of 30% female directors is reached. Thus, the current representation of 14%
females on corporate boards in our sample might not be sufficient to show either the positive
or negative effect that increased gender diversity might have on firm performance.
Lastly, women generally experience higher levels of chronic stress than men [75], especially
when working in male-dominated industries, where they suffer from increased stress and
worse mental health than men [76] and might be perceived as tokens [36]. These differences in
experienced stress might influence the relationship between gender diversity and firm perfor-
mance, depending on the industry in which it is measured. For example, it would be interesting
to examine if women’s influence is more pronounced in traditionally female-dominated indus-
tries as opposed to male-dominated industries. Similarly, Post & Byron [4] also suggest that
female directors might influence firm performance stronger in customer-proximal industries.
Conclusion
In recent years, interest in gender diversity and the representation of females in leadership
positions has evidenced a steep increase. Many scientific studies have investigated the relation-
ship between female representation on corporate boards and firm financial performance, but,
so far, the results are contradictory. The results of the current meta-analysis show that a higher
representation of females on corporate boards is neither related to a decrease, nor to an
increase in firm financial performance, confirming findings from a similar meta-analysis on
this topic [4]. These results do not support the business case for diversity, which suggests that
diversity is associated with an increase in performance. However, they allow the conclusion
that gender diversity should be promoted for ethical reasons to promote fairness. If a larger
representation of female directors does not matter with regard to firm performance, females, if
equally qualified, should be given priority when promotion decisions are made.
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